For all of you who like alleged "strict constructionist" judges like Scalia because they don't legislate from the bench, the Supreme Court has just reduced the punitive damages award in the Exxon Valdez case from $2.5 billion to $500 million, effectively creating a rule that punitive damages cannot exceed the economic damages in a case. Let me assure you, there's nothing in the punitive damages statute in question that would give rise to such an interpretation.

Hypocrisy like this makes me sick to my stomach.

When you say "economic damages," what does that include? The cost of the oil? Ship repairs? Clean-up effort?

In Alaska, Riki Ott, a fisherman and scientist and longtime environmental activist in the Prince William Sound town of Cordova, where most of the area's fishing fleet is concentrated, was disappointed by the ruling.

"We were really counting on punitive damages paying for our long-term losses in the fishery. That's obviously not going to happen," Ott said. "Well, that's an affront to everyone's sense of justice."

Evidence that Congress has affirmatively chosen not to restrict the availability of a particular remedy favors
adherence to a policy of judicial restraint in the absence of some special justification. The Court not only fails to offerany such justification, but also ignores the particular features of maritime law that may counsel against imposing
the sort of limitation the Court announces today.Applying the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard thatis well grounded in the common law, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
...

And the Court today rightly decides that in passing the Clean Water Act, Congress did not displace or in any way diminish the availability of common-law punitive damages remedies. (Emphasis mine)

...
Until Congress orders us to impose a rigid formula togovern the award of punitive damages in maritime cases, I would employ our familiar abuse-of-discretion standard: “If no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the appellate
court, at least in the federal system, is merely toreview the trial court’s ‘determination under an abuse-ofdiscretion
standard,’” Cooper Industries, Inc., 532 U. S., at 433; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U. S. 1, 15 (1991) (“Under the traditional common-law approach,
the amount of the punitive award is initially determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity ofthe wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial andappellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable”).
On an abuse-of-discretion standard, I am persuaded that a reviewing court should not invalidate this award.

Heightening my reservations about the 1:1 solution is JUSTICE STEVENS’ comment on the venturesome character of the Court’s decision. In the States, he observes, fixed ratios and caps have been adopted by legislatures; this
Court has not identified “[any] state court that has imposed
a precise ratio” in lieu of looking to the legislature as the appropriate source of a numerical damage limitation.
Ante, at 6. For the reasons stated, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the new law made by the Court should have been left to Congress. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Punitive damages are designed to punish a wrongdoer, while compensatory damages compensate a wronged party for the loss they suffered. The applicable law, the federal Clean Water Act, doesn't even allow for punitive damages for oil spills. Also, what exactly did Exxon do wrong that they are being punished for? The fault was not with the company, but the captain and crew. And federal maritime law prevents company owners from being held liable for personally negligent conduct by the captain or crew.

Corporate Personhood should essentially eliminate the idea that corporations are not responsible for the actions or negligence of their employees. That would be like saying, "The knife stabbed that guy. I'm not responsible for the assault, the knife is." If corporations want the full rights of an individual, they should be held to the same levels of responsibility.

Farscry wrote:

nsmike wrote:

Corporate Personhood should essentially eliminate the idea that corporations are not responsible for the actions or negligence of their employees. That would be like saying, "The knife stabbed that guy. I'm not responsible for the assault, the knife is." If corporations want the full rights of an individual, they should be held to the same levels of responsibility.

I second this notion.

So what do we do when the "assault" is caused by a defective "knife"?

Arms and knives don't act independently, like employees; false analogy.

I'd worry more about the counter-argument. Suppose companies *are* liable for all actions of their employees on company time. Without a reasonable distinction between valid and invalid actions, an employee could hold the company hostage by threatening to commit crimes or irresponsible actions, with the company being held responsible. That would not be useful; some distinction needs to exist so that the companies don't operate under constant threat of, for lack of a better word, betrayal.

Arms and knives don't act independently, like employees; false analogy.

I'd worry more about the counter-argument. Suppose companies *are* liable for all actions of their employees on company time. Without a reasonable distinction between valid and invalid actions, an employee could hold the company hostage by threatening to commit crimes or irresponsible actions, with the company being held responsible. That would not be useful; some distinction needs to exist so that the companies don't operate under constant threat of, for lack of a better word, betrayal.

Robear wrote:

Arms and knives don't act independently, like employees; false analogy.

I'd worry more about the counter-argument. Suppose companies *are* liable for all actions of their employees on company time. Without a reasonable distinction between valid and invalid actions, an employee could hold the company hostage by threatening to commit crimes or irresponsible actions, with the company being held responsible. That would not be useful; some distinction needs to exist so that the companies don't operate under constant threat of, for lack of a better word, betrayal.

Can't the company just fire that individual?

What happens if a worker at an automobile factory gets killed by some automated robotic arms? Company's fault? They own the robots, the robots were acting out of direct human control, someone died.